In this study the question of work as both a condition and mode of human self-realization is explored. The argument begins with Ju¨rgen Habermas's dualist theory of society, specifically his Ôlife-world/system' contrast and the Ôcolonization' thesis which issues from it. Although motivated by a desire to critically lay bare pervasive lifeworld pathologies, Habermas's Ôcolonization' thesis, as a result of the communicative versus instrumental reason binary which provides its foundation, has the decidedly uncritical effect of effacing the ethical-political significance of work and production for people's everyday lives. By contrast, Alasdair MacIntyre's nondualist theory of Ôpractice' provides a means by which to recover and reflect upon this essential Ôlifeworld' component. Especially important here is MacIntyre's critique of managerial conceptions of production, but more specifically his suggestion of an alternative mode of human productivity that is neither purely instrumental nor primarily communicative, but rather both simultaneously, a form of human activity which effects changes in and produces the human artifice, and yet presumes a reflective community of actors bound together by constitutive excellences. Re-conceived in this manner, work assumes the potentially emancipatory aspect neglected or directly denied by much current social and political theory. However, MacIntyre's contribution to the attempt to rethink the contemporary significance of productive activity is compromised by a thorough-going anti-modernism which threatens to render his theory of practice anachronistic. Hence the need for an understanding of work located squarely within the critical possibilities of the present.
CRITICAL THEORY, HABERMAS, AND THE DEVALUATION OF PRODUCTIVE WORK
Marx's account of the four-fold alienation of man under capitalism's regime of abstract labour-of man from his product, from his activity of producing, from his Ôspecies-being' or essential nature, and from other men-finds clearest practical manifestation in the late 19th-early 20th century discipline of Ôscientific workplace management', as articulated in Frederick Taylor's 1911 classic, The Principles of Scientific Management. 2 There are three core features to Taylor's vision of scientifically managed work: the detachment of work from the skills and knowledge of workers and, therefore, the increasing superfluity of worker expertise; the separation of conception from execution, that is, of planning work from the process of carrying out work, of managers from workers; and, finally, precise managerial control over every aspect of the working process. It was against early materializations of such detailed and fragmented divisions of labour that the early Marx, drawing on a model of autonomous craftsmanship, juxtaposed his ideal of concrete or truly human labour: work that is simultaneously the possession and expression of the individual worker in all her diversity and in genuine community with others. Indeed, Marx saw social labour as the mode of human emancipation, since he conceived social labour as the context within which human beings come to consciousness of reality and of their true capabilities, as well as the contingent oppressive constraints imposed upon these capabilities by particular social orders. 3 Despite the increasing regimentation and dehumanization of working life, Marx insisted that it was only through social labour that such dehumanization could be contested and eventually overcome.
It is against the background of Marx's prioritization of social labour that Habermas's version of critical theory has to be understood. Habermas's key objection to Marx is that he stands guilty of a categorical monism that reduces all forms of human action to work. As Habermas sees it, the danger of this monism is twofold: a reduction of all aspects of social reality and human experience to the economic, and, more problematically still, to the technologies or forces of production that in large part constitute the economic. Though not Marx's intention, his elevation of labour Ôcould very quickly be interpreted in a mechanistic manner' where the movements of history were identifiable with material causal laws. 4 That interpretation provides legitimation for technological determinism and technocracy, since if the course of human history is identifiable with material causal laws, then only those with access to or knowledge of these laws ought to rule. In turn, the effect of this scientization of politics is the reduction of political endeavour to an instrumental means, to administration, and thereby a denial of its genuinely moral-ethical content -the need for citizens to deliberate over and critically evaluate their ends. 5 To counter the elision of ethics, Habermas distinguishes labour (poiesis) from human interaction (praxis) -the key distinction, he claims, blurred by Marx. 6 This distinction forms the bedrock of Habermas's dualist reconstruction of historical materialism and, as well, his attempt to recover the normative potential of modernity from the pessimistic analyses of modern rationalization offered by Max Weber. In short, labour corresponds to the material reproduction of the species -human beings' attempt to control and dominate nature -whereas interaction corresponds to our species' social reproduction, the linguistic co-generation of symbolic order. Fundamental here is a distinction between communicative and instrumental action/reason. When actors reason instrumentally, in line with Weberian Zweckrationalita¨t, they reason according to technical criteria and empirical facts as to the best means to their desired ends, where objects and people are viewed as resources to those ends. Efficiency and success are therefore the criteria governing instrumental action. In contrast, communicative action is governed by the internal goal of mutual understanding, where subjects reason 5 ÔTechnocratic consciousness reflects not the sundering of an ethical situation but the repression of Ôethics' as such as a category of life', Habermas, Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics (London: Heinemann, 1971), p. 112. I ignore Habermas's later division of Ôethics' and Ômorality'.
6 ÔMarx does not actually explicate the interrelationship of interaction and labour, but instead, under the unspecific title of social praxis, reduces the one to the other, namely communicative action to instrumental action … the productive activity which regulates the material exchange of the human species with its natural environment, becomes the paradigm for the generation of all the categories', Habermas, dialogically on the basis of publicly assessable validity claims (truth, rightness, truthfulness) in the hope of arriving at an uncoerced Ôrationally motivated assent'.
7 On the basis of this separation of action types, Habermas then differentiates two irreducible modes of rationalization, lifeworld and systemic rationalization. By Ôlifeworld' Habermas intends the intersubjective horizon of pre-given space and pre-theoretical knowledge and assumptions in which people exist, act, and interact. Lifeworld rationalization means, in short, that the reflective symbolic achievements of cultural knowledge transmission, of social integration, and of identity formation, the paths along which a distinctly human life is formed, increasingly issue more from Ôrationally motivated agreement' than from customary beliefs and pre-reflective mores.
8 Systemic rationalization, differently, refers to the increasing material productivity and formal organization of human social orders. Its criterion is not communication but the intensifying complexity of an increasingly depersonalized instrumental rationality Ôaccessible only to the counterintuitive knowledge of the social sciences developing since the eighteenth century'.
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The point of this Ôtwo-level' theory of society is to show, contra the ideology of technicism, that technical progress and social emancipation are distinct -that they are achieved according to two distinct logics or modes of rationalization.
10 Although Habermas does not dismiss technological consciousness or the positivist natural science perspective on which it rests, he does want to limit it to its proper domain. Thus, while technological consciousness is appropriate as regards material production and formal organization, he insists that Ôonly the communicative use of propositionally differentiated language … is proper to our socio-cultural forms of life'. Given this practical emphasis, it is clear that Habermas does not conceive of the lifeworld-system distinction in analytic terms alone. Rather, central to his account of the development of modern social forms is a desire to illuminate how realms of Ônorm-free sociality' historically broke free or Ôuncoupled' from the lifeworld contexts of family and civil society (the bourgeois public sphere).
13 Thus Ôthe social' is split up into spheres of action constituted as the lifeworld and spheres neutralized against the lifeworld. The former are communicatively structured, the latter formally organized … [standing] opposite one another as socially and systemically integrated spheres of action.
14 Governed by a Ôlatent functionality' (instrumental reason Ôwrit large') that works behind the backs of actors, the sub-systems of the economy and bureaucratic state are Ôregulated only via power and money'. Indeed, Ônorm-conformative attitudes and identityforming social memberships are neither necessary nor possible in these spheres; they are made peripheral instead'. 15 However, it would be wrong, Habermas claims, simply to condemn this uncoupling. Systemic rationalization represents an evolutionary advance in productivity and organizational potential, the market and modern bureaucratic forms being the only efficient means by which to determine equivalences between disparate goods and to co-ordinate policy initiatives. 16 Far from alleviating the maladies of the present, a de-differentiating rejection of systemic complexity would mean both a repressive embrace of metaphysical totalities and social chaos. Against idealizations of the past, Habermas argues that systemic imperatives only become destructive when they reach in and transform the irreplaceable reproductive mechanisms of the lifeworld. This occurs when systemic crises (Ôdisequilibria'), such as class conflict or recession, are Ôsuccessfully intercepted by having recourse to lifeworld resources', that is, by re-defining lifeworld structures so as to reduce the likelihood of material or organizational instability.
17 Such Ôcolonization' or Ômediatization' has drastic effects because cultural and intersubjective meaning can Ôneither be bought nor coerced'. 18 When symbolic needs and lifeworld roles are translated into systemic imperatives, communal and individual life suffer Ôabstraction' and cease to be the result of communication or intersubjective will. Increasing their areas of competency and control, the market and state therefore loom over the lifeworld as a Ôquasi-natural force' or Ôsecond nature' beyond the power of subjects to understand or to change.
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The goal of critical theory, then, is to locate and counter the colonization of lifeworld by system. The later Habermas sees Ônew social movements' and the interplay of Ôweak' and Ôstrong' publics as the best means for contesting the commodification and bureaucratization of everyday life. 20 However, he places two key limits on this politics of resistance. First, and pivotally, the old utopian vision inhering in the ideal of a Ôlabouring society' no longer has force. This Marxist and pre-Marxist vision no longer applies insofar as labour, as self-creative activity, has irretrievably succumbed to system, the one attempt at reversing this trend having concluded in the disaster of state socialism. 21 of human intersubjectivity. Second, an emancipatory politics must be both critical and self-limiting. Consequent upon Ôuncoupling', a politics trying to render systemic imperatives less destructive of lifeworld infrastructures must nevertheless respect the logics of the economy and state administration. Rather than Ôconquering' system, the goal is to indirectly curb or guide it toward an equilibrium between the integrative forces of intersubjective communication, money, and administrative power. Undemocratizable Ôfrom within', the economy and administrative state can be held in check solely by a Ôradical reformist' approach aimed at erecting Ôa democratic dam against ... colonizing encroachment'.
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There are undoubted strengths to Habermas's position. Emphasizing the significance of communicatively generated solidarity, he arrives at a heuristically fruitful counter-factual by which to illuminate and criticize illegitimate forms of power that arise from uninterrogated prejudices, deception, or unprincipled coercion. His rejection of economic reductivism and stress on the difference between technical progress and social emancipation also fundamentally ring true. Human freedom does not equate with an abundance of consumer goods or with ever more efficient administration. Furthermore, the critique of Ôcolonization' echoes those broader movements within socialist, environmental, and feminist thought which condemn the injustices and cruelties occasioned by burgeoning markets and untrammelled state bureaucracies.
Yet there are also good reasons for rejecting Habermas's dualist theory of society. The first concerns his Ôuncoupling' thesis and the claim that Ôsystem' represents a block of Ônorm-free sociality'. In short, what Habermas ignores in interpreting modern economic institutions in systemic-functional terms is the dependence of these institutions on specific moral-ethical attitudes, the fact that they are never norm-free. For instance, Durkheim famously made clear that the market mechanisms of contract and exchange are impossible without trust, without the assumption that agreements will be honoured. Such trust is not secured by coercive legal enforcement alone, but also by a scheme of social conventions and mores that renders capitalist exchange both desirable and normal, transforming it into the Ônatural' order of things. Thus, without an Ôenterprise culture', a culture which celebrates exchange and profit as goods, the market as a system of determining equivalences between disparate goods would most likely cease to exist or at least be subject to significant disruption. Moreover, modern capitalism was not just born of latent functional imperatives, but also underpinned and motivated by venerable ethical arguments, the most significant being the view that market societies, in contrast to the customary hierarchies of earlier societies, ensure individual freedom and prosperity. As Booth puts it, Ôthe mode of producing and distributing the means of human sustenance embodied in the market is expressive not [only] of a human propensity to truck, trade, and barter … but [also] of a moral redrawing of the community and of the place of the economy within it'. 24 Obscuring these classical liberal arguments, Habermas also veils important moral-ethical counterarguments to market capitalism, one of the most significant being that under capitalism the productive capacities of human beings suffer avertable distortion.
The idea of an Ôuncoupling' of lifeworld and system, of a supposed division between normatively imbued realms of human intercourse and realms purged of moral-ethical values, is therefore deceptive -more an instance of grand myth-making than a reliable historical account. 25 However, the difficulty with the lifeworld-system dualism is not just one of poor history. Rather, the core problem is that this essentialist distinction bifurcates communicative from instrumental action, symbolic from material reproduction, in assigning each to ontologically spatialized and opposed realms, with the result that in certain arenas of human life important 24 possibilities for intervention and change are ruled out by unsubstantiated theoretical fiat.
26
This is most obvious as regards the concept and reality of work. As Habermas understands it, work equates with the domination and control of external nature. This control is at best a pre-condition of human emancipation, not a rudimentary element or expression of such emancipation. In contrast to the intersubjectivity inherent in communicative reason, work is a purely instrumental category whose meaning exists outside itself, that is, in the products and commodities produced. The result of this line of thought is that work as a mode of human experience and endeavour is peremptorily purged of any internal moral-ethical significance. The only evaluative criterion is that of efficiency, not the character of the human relationships that pertain in production. This has the effect of not only concealing the role that employment and job status have on individuals' self-esteem, but also the ways in which different forms of work enable or inhibit human freedom and happiness. 27 Worse still, in deferring to systemic complexity Habermasian critical theory validates the present, rather than calling it into question. The best achievable is a fairer distribution of resources and indirect regulation of the economy in terms of basic human rights. Any attempt to alter the internal structures of existing working practices is condemned as Ôunrealistic' romanticism, as a failure to 26 For similar criticisms of the lifeworld-system dualism, see James Bohman, ÔHabermas, Marxism, and Social Theory: The Case for Pluralism in Critical Social Science', in Peter Dews (ed. come to terms with the Ôhard-to-resist imperatives' and Ôfunctional demands' of a Ôglobalized system of market relations'. 28 The injustices, hardships, and drudgery suffered by men and women in their working lives are therefore no longer attributable to human agency and deliberate design, but issue instead from a reified and immutable logic.
Rejecting Marx's identification of emancipation with social labour, Habermas goes to the opposite extreme of denying work any emancipatory import whatsoever. In mirror image to Marx, therefore, he himself stands guilty of reductivism, of reducing moral-ethical experience to one form of human activity. Communicative reason is both the sole source and mode of human maturity and freedom. Gone is any sense that work might embody unique aspects of human value and aspiration, might represent possibilities for self-realization and autonomy unavailable in other activities. Given this, it is clearly the case that Habermas offers a peculiarly uncritical brand of critical theory. Admittedly, Habermas believes his Ôcolonization' thesis an apposite diagnosis of capitalism's illeffects. The problem with this thesis, however, is that it suggests these ill-effects are due to something extrinsic, the structures of material reproduction, invading something intrinsic or uniquely human, symbolic reproduction. Attributing an extrinsic status to the material, Ôcolonization' is therefore already a capitulation which in its very conception forfeits labour and human beings' productive capacities to the latent functionalism of system. With it the social and psychological significance of one's work and occupation, their role in forming lifeworld identities, is suppressed and distanced from reflection. Instead, work and the realm of production are deemed inherently technical issues. The paradoxical consequence of this, unfortunately, is to reinforce Taylor's managerialist conception of work and to support, rather than contest, existing capitalism as an economic order. Habermas, a thinker whose ambition has been to overcome false objectivisms and their political correlate, technocracy, actually ends up consigning large swathes of social reality to those very same falsehoods.
MACINTYRE'S RECOVERY OF WORK
To avoid Habermas's uncritical turn, we need a concept of work which retains a core ethical and therefore emancipatory referent, one which, as Honneth proposes, grasps Ôcategorically' the difference between work understood as an Ôact in which the working subject structures and regulates his own activity' and an impoverished conception Ôin which neither the accompanying controls nor the object-related structuring of the activity is left to the initiative of the working-subject'. 29 Here I want to suggest that Alasdair MacIntyre's neo-Aristotelian idea of Ôpractice' provides such a concept. My underlying claim is not that MacIntyre offers a detailed description of what any specific form of productive work ought to look like, but rather that he provides a defensible general conception of meaningful work to counter currently dominant technicist conceptions. To lend credibility to this claim, I make two interrelated arguments: first, that MacIntyre, in providing an intersubjective conception of practice, shows productive work to be simultaneously community dependent and a mode of individual self-transformation, therefore inescapably of intrinsic moral-ethical import; second, that his thoughts on practices and their relation to what he calls Ôinstitutions' yield a non-dualist conception of social reality, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of Habermas's lifeworld-system dichotomy in bridging the instrumental versus communicative action divide. These insights, combined with other elements of MacIntyre's thought, together provide a defensible alternative to managerially determined divisions of labour.
The Concept of ÔPractice'
What, then, is a Ôpractice'? Practices, for MacIntyre, Ôinclude a variety of arts, sciences, games and … such productive activities as 29 Honneth, ÔWork and Instrumental Action', p. 46. Honneth later retreats from this call for a critical concept of work, conceding the Habermasian view that Ôone can with good reasons' argue that Ôthe criteria of moral assessment cannot be related to the internal character of the work process itself' (ÔAuthor's Introduction' (1995), in Honneth, The Fragmented World of the Social: Essays in Social and Political Philosophy, p. xviii).
those of farming and fishing'. 30 They also include philosophizing, child-rearing, and politics, at least in its classical Aristotelian, as opposed to liberal, form. The characteristics which any practice exhibits when in good order are revealed in MacIntyre's definition of the term. A practice is:
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. 31 The key notions here are Ôcooperative activity', Ôgoods internal', and Ôstandards of excellence'. First, all practices are communal endeavours, presuming not only the participation of a current generation of individuals but also a Ôtradition' or history which guides and informs that generation's activity. 32 Thus, carpentry, no less than physics, is informed by principles, ideals, and bodies of knowledge inherited from the past. Second, and decisively, there is a crucial distinction to be made between Ôinternal' and Ôexternal' goods. 33 External goods are the generic goods of money, power, status, and prestige, whereas internal goods are specific to an individual practice, that is, can only be known and achieved through 30 sustained engagement in the practice itself. Thus, the internal good of carpentry inheres in both Ôthe excellence in performance' of the carpenter in producing her product and in the excellence of this product itself. 34 These are to be distinguished from the wealth, fame, or power which may contingently accrue to her as a carpenter on account of market conditions or the status enjoyed by her occupation. Because they have no internal relation to specific practical activities, external goods can be gained without immersion in a practice's tradition or history, as the prevalence of Ôcowboy' tradespersons proves all too well. Moreover, whereas all members of a practice and, by extension the wider community which prizes that practice, benefit from advancement in internal goods -whether it be long-distance running or innovative art forms -external goods are largely Ôzero-sum' insofar as they are usually possessed by distinct individuals or groups and not the community as a whole. 35 Third, as implied by the terms Ôco-operative activity' and Ôgoods internal', each practice is defined by Ôstandards of excellence' which both determine the goal of the activity, its telos, and regulate its internal functioning. That is, to be able to perform within a practice one must initially submit to the authority of the impersonal standards which encapsulate the highest level of achievement attained within that practice at a given point in time. Moreover, not only does success in a practice require deference to established standards; it also requires key qualities of character or virtues which enable one to accept and recognize such standards as exemplified by others. Thus, a novice practitioner cannot advance within her craft unless she possesses honesty in estimating her own abilities; justice in according others recognition for their successes; and courage in enduring the possibility of failure. An inability to cultivate these virtues Ôrenders the practice pointless except as a device for achieving external goods'. 36 34 AV, p. 189. 35 ÔExternal goods are therefore characteristically objects of competition in which there must be losers as well as winners. Internal goods are indeed the outcome of competition to excel, but it is characteristic of them that their achievement is a good for the whole community who participate in the practice' (AV, .
36 AV, p. 191.
Finally, a practice requires not only individual virtue, but also a supportive context. Hence MacIntyre's distinction between Ôpractices' and Ôinstitutions'. Whether they be craft guilds, laboratories, universities, or hospitals, institutions Ôare characteristically and necessarily concerned with … external goods'. 37 Since practices and practitioners require money and other material resources, they simply cannot exist without institutional frameworks. However, this institutional dependence leaves practices acutely vulnerable to corruption, to their internal goods -or teloi -being overwhelmed by the vice of avarice (pleonexia).
It is precisely such institutional corruption, where internal goods are subordinated to a desire for wealth or power, which defines many modern productive activities. Reduced to the status of a job, as in assembly lines or de-skilled service industries, work is now Ôseparated from everything but the service of biological survival and the reproduction of the labour force, on the one hand, and that of institutionalized acquisitiveness, on the other'. 38 Modern workers work, therefore, not to create, excel, or achieve but simply to consume, in line with the wider suppositions of our liberal Ôemo-tivist' culture. 39 The workplace has no connection with their wider aspirations or goals, with who they are or who they wish to become. Instead, it is a realm of existence that is to be contrasted negatively with the realms of familial life and of leisure. Thus, there comes about a compartmentalization of human existence in which 37 each sphere has Ôits own role structure governed by its own specific norms'. 40 And in the workplace it is managerial norms, norms that explicitly and consciously suppress the human potential of workers, treating them not as ends-in-themselves but as manipulable objects, that have assumed priority above all others.
Work as Intersubjective Self-Transformation
The preceding account already suggests the distinctiveness of MacIntyre's position. His concern is not primarily with worker democracy, with altering occupational status, or with fairer distributions of the material resources accruing from production, although he is acutely cognizant of the importance of these issues. 41 Rather, the focus of his theory of practices is the working process itself, that is, the relationships entered, the capacities exercised, and the goals achieved by individuals in their productive activities. 42 In this MacIntyre offers an understanding of the internal working process that is superior not only to Habermas's instrumentalized conception but also to the early Marx's concept of non-alienated labour. And one key respect in which it is superior is in its re-conception of work as essentially intersubjective, both in the sense of presuming 40 trans-historical communities of practitioners and, as a consequence, interpersonal modes of identity formation and transformation.
Although MacIntyre owes much to Marx's ideal of non-alienated labour, he differs from Marx on work in a number of ways.
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Most obviously, where Marx identifies emancipatory praxis with Ôsocial labour', MacIntyre endorses a pluralist understanding of practical activity, ranging from farming and architecture to philosophizing and government. He therefore avoids the charge of reducing such praxis to work, without, however, denying that productive activity has an emancipatory referent, as Habermas unfortunately does. This advance is augmented by MacIntyre's more realistic vision of non-alienated labour. Marx rejected all specialization or division of labour as inherently oppressive. In its stead, he offered a highly romantic, expressivist vision of working life, where the worker engages unhindered in any activity she wishes, the object of her effort being the realization of her own powers. 44 From a MacIntyrean viewpoint this ideal is to be faulted for neglecting the fact that meaningful engagement by an individual in a specific practice or practices precludes equal effort being devoted to alternative practices, since such engagement necessarily draws on limited resources. 45 Thus, specialization and division of labour are inevitable, although certainly not specialization in the Taylorist, 43 On MacIntyre's indebtedness to the early Marx on labour, which is explained by their shared Aristotelianism, see TF, p. 225; Keat, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market, pp. 5, 29; and Peter McMylor, Alasdair MacIntyre: Critic of Modernity (London, New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 46-73. 44 A key statement of this utopian vision appears in The German Ideology: Ôin communist society … each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another thing tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic' (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 47, my emphasis). 45 Practices Ôwill often be contingently incompatible and … make rival claims upon our allegiance' because human beings are necessarily finite beings enjoying neither boundless time nor ability (AV, p. 197). For similar criticisms of Marx's rejection of the division of labour, which depends upon a mistaken conflation of specialization with forced, de-humanizing specialization, see Jon Elster, ÔSelf-Reali- managerial sense. More fundamentally, it is also to be faulted for insufficient attention to the social or communal basis of all practical endeavour, the fact that work presumes dependence on others and on distinct socio-historical traditions.
It is, of course, true that Marx's notion of non-alienated labour suggests an irreducible intersubjectivity in stressing the overcoming of workers' alienation from Ôother men'. However, what such overcoming would involve, what it would mean to be in constructive social relation with others, is left largely unexplored. Indeed, as MacIntyre sees it, Marxism was from the Ôoutset' characterized by a Ôcertain radical individualism' that is unable to properly explain how genuinely liberating modes of practical endeavour come into being. 46 Comprehending how such endeavours are formed means comprehending the truth that Ôwe are never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors of our own narratives', in other words, that Ôthe narrative of any one life is part of an interlocking set of narratives'. 47 Even if alone, when we engage in productive work we are implicitly participating in a community of past and present workers. This truth reveals key moral-ethical aspects of working life underthematized by Marx and completely neglected within Habermasian theory. Most significant is that meaningful workwork which is not simply the repetitive execution of discrete tasksrequires learning, requires the individual to apprentice herself to a specific profession and to accept, as already explained, its authoritative standards of excellence. 48 Learning entails, in turn, the fundamentally ethical relationship of pupil and teacher. 49 And while initially characterized by inequality, this relationship is nonetheless reciprocal, pupils according respect to their teachers on account of 46 AV, p. 261. See also RPM, pp. 246-247; TF, pp. 232-234; MC: p. xxxi; and Keat, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market, p. 5. This individualist element in Marxism explains why it never could arrive at a true alternative to liberal morality, when it concerned itself with morality at all, but always ended up endorsing some form of utilitarianism (Kautsky, Trotsky) or Kantian deontology (Bernstein, Guevara).
47 AV, pp. 213, 218. 48 ÔIt belongs to the concept of a practice … that its goods can only be achieved by subordinating ourselves within the practice in our relationship to other practitioners' (Ibid., pp. 191, 258; WJ, p. 31). superior experience, teachers, differently, exhibiting care and regard for their pupils.
Habermas fails to grasp this educative dimension of work because his ideal of communicative action presumes subjects who are epistemically and experientially the same, that is, who possess equal authority. Any activity which presumes unequal authority is therefore sidelined, a result which is compounded by his identification of work with the domination of nature. Yet, far from being dominative, the relationship between apprentice and master craftsperson is, when properly ordered, fundamentally enabling and transformative. 50 The intrinsic goal of Ôproductive crafts … is never only to catch fish, or produce beef or milk' but also Ôto do so in a manner consonant with the excellences of the craft, so that there is not only a good product, but the craftsperson is perfected through and in her or his activity'. 51 This understanding of work as a mode of human striving and perfection presupposes a distinctly Aristotelian understanding of human nature and development. In contrast to liberal ethical theory, which in its utilitarian and neutralist forms privileges individuals' given wants and desires, Aristotelianism presumes a gap between Ôman-ashe-happens-to-be' and Ôman-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essentialnature'. 52 Under this view the function of ethical reflection and cooperative activity is, therefore, not to reinforce who we currently are but to facilitate human flourishing, eudaimonia, that is, the selves that we could become if we realized our potentialities. Engaging in a practice, then, the apprentice does not simply satisfy her existing preferences and desires; rather, she extends her innate capacities and powers and this, MacIntyre suggests, in three decisive ways.
The first, as already intimated, relates to the character of the practitioner -and to the fact that to succeed in a practice she must cultivate the virtues of honesty, justice, and courage, amongst others. Basic to this transformation of character is a transformation of desire, of the will. 53 53 Individuals make the good of a practice Ôtheir own only by allowing their participation in the activity to effect a transformation in the desires which they initially brought with them to the activity' (TF, pp. 225-226).
will gradually realize that what they had initially desired (money, status, a job) when entering, for example, the practice of carpentry is not what they, qua carpenters, should truly aim at -which is, of course, being the best carpenters possible. Necessitating discipline and patience, such transformation does not, however, entail an unrealistic altruism or a denial of one's inclinations. As MacIntyre notes, the goods internal to a practice are Ôindeed the outcome of competition to excel ', to prove oneself the best. 54 Moreover, when practitioners have cultivated themselves to appreciate the excellences of a particular practice, they Ôcharacteristically' enjoy their achievement and Ôactivity in achieving'. 55 That is, a specific form of pleasure Ôsupervenes' upon successful performance of their roles as carpenter, engineer, etc. However, while engagement in meaningful work is not to be equated with self-sacrifice, it is to be sharply differentiated from the ruthless pursuit of money or power and the pleasures which these external goods bring, since the latter do not necessitate and are infrequently inimical to the entrance into and maintenance of practices.
The second manner in which the apprentice is transformed relates to her innate capacities and powers. The goal of learning and of teaching is not simply to transmit knowledge from one generation to the next, but also to enable the apprentice to herself become a master practitioner. Such mastery implies having the knowledge, skills, experience, sensitivities, and clarity of judgement necessary to execute complex tasks in moments of novelty and uncertainty. Meaningful work is therefore work which contributes positively to the development of worker maturity, freedom. This freedom or autonomy is not born of freedom from others, the mistaken view MacIntyre attributes to Nietzsche, Sartre and much liberal thinking. 56 Instead, such freedom is born of networks of interdependence that facilitate the transition from initial passive acceptance of received patterns of thought and action to active independent practical reasoning. 57 The pinnacle of maturity in productive practices comes when the worker can question in an 54 58 Such achievement is often fraught with difficulty and conflict; indeed, it is Ôsometimes only through conflict that we learn what our ends and purposes are'. 59 Nonetheless, it is in the nature of meaningful work to enable us to constructively question the past. And, in line with MacIntyre's critique of compartmentalization, if we lack such freedom in our working lives, we are also likely to lack it in leisure time, in familial life, and in politics. 60 Excellence in work relies on a dialectic of acceptance and critique, of honest recognition of the achievements of past workers and yet the desire to better and transcend these successes. There is, nonetheless, a third way in which meaningful work is transformative. Becoming proficient in a practice, workers do not only alter their character or attain greater maturity. They also Ôdiscover within the pursuit of excellence … the good of a certain kind of life', a good which cannot be attained in any other activity. 61 Thus, the sculptor discovers those goods unique to the role and life of the sculptor, just as do carpenters, miners, or builders when they engage in their work. The importance of this goes far beyond working activity itself insofar as the goods unique to working life complement and add to goods associated with other roles typically occupied by individuals, whether that of citizen, parent, or, indeed, consumer. Moreover, in engendering goods unique to their practice, goods both internal to the performance of their activity (initiative, dexterity, right judgement, etc) and the products which issue from it (artworks, buildings, quality produce), workers contribute to the manifold possibilities of human life and experience. 62 That is, they exemplify, qua workers, a key aspect of what it means to be human, therefore adding something of enduring Ôuniversal worth' to our fundamental condition.
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MacIntyre's Non-Dualist Social Theory
From the above, it is clear that in proposing an intersubjective theory of practice MacIntyre helps retrieve work as a phenomenon possessing intrinsic moral-ethical significance. It should also be clear that his project is essentially emancipatory, contra those who accuse him of conservative conventionalism. 64 The key criteria of meaningful work are not passivity or deference to tradition as an end-in-itself, but learning, striving, and increasing mastery. And although he insists on Ôparticularity', on our being located in specific socio-historical traditions, MacIntyre is nonetheless adamant that Ôit is in moving forward from such particularity that the search for the good, for the universal, consists'. 65 When in good order, work exemplifies this urge towards the good life as such.
However, we saw earlier that Habermas's denigration of work stemmed not simply from his elimination of its internal ethical import, but also from the structure of his wider social theory. Dividing social action into the categories of communicative and instrumental/strategic action, Habermas splits social reality into two, with Ôlifeworld' corresponding to the communicative realms of family and civil society, and Ôsystem' corresponding to the Ônorm-free sociality' definitive of the administrative state and capitalist market. The result is that productive activity is surrendered to and deemed the proper preserve of technocracy. Here I want to show how a MacIntyrean conception of practice escapes this quietist dualist vision.
One crucial way in which MacIntyre breaks with Habermasian social dualism is already apparent. Where Habermas reduces work to efficient productivity, to the external ends it serves, MacIntyre stresses the internal dimensions of working life without, however, denying the importance of productivity or external goods. Some commentators, particularly David Miller, have accused MacIntyre of focusing on Ôself-contained practices' such as chess and sport, whose goals are internal to the practices themselves (excellent cricketeering, let's say), to the neglect of Ôpurposive practices' such as building, farming, or medicine, whose goal lies outside the performance of the practice, that is, lies in the products produced, whether houses, food, or public health. 66 Miller's point is that these Ôpurposive activities' are far more significant socially than Ôself-contained practices' and that the criteria for evaluating them are not internal to the practice itself but lie outside in the Ôbroader social ends' that the practice serves. Thus, MacIntyre's emphasis on internal goods, while not entirely wrong, is nonetheless mistaken. Yet this criticism is a serious misreading of MacIntyre's position. As regards productive work, MacIntyre is quite clear that the good internal to such work consists simultaneously in the excellence of the worker's performance and in the excellence of the product. 67 It is simply false, therefore, to claim that he is unconcerned with productivity or with the use-value that inheres in products. Moreover, 66 David Miller, ÔVirtues, Practices and Justice', in Horton and Mendus (eds), After MacIntyre, 245-264, p. 254. 67 Using the example of portrait painting, MacIntyre (AV, p. 189, my emphasis) insists that its internal good consists Ôfirst of all' in Ôthe excellence of the products, both the excellence in performance by the painters and that of each portrait itself'. It is worth noting, too, that he rejects Miller's accusation that he ignores the wider social goals associated with practices. Indeed, as MacIntyre (AV, p. 275; RPM, pp. 242-245; ÔA Partial Response', p. 284; ÔSocial Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency', pp. 315-321) understands it, a full account of human flourishing requires practices to be situated in terms of their contribution to individual narratives/lives and the wider well-being of particular communities and historical traditions.
MacIntyre in no way denies the importance of external goods, either in the form of particular products, of money, of power, or of status. These Ôexternal goods genuinely are goods … [and] no one can despise them altogether without a certain hypocrisy'. 68 The point of his introducing the internal-external good distinction is not, then, to privilege internal ends over external ends or to underplay purposive activity, but instead to contrast those forms of work in which working life is lived solely for the money or power which accrue to it with those in which working life is both materially rewarding and intrinsically meaningful. Thus, the question of economic productivity and the question of the moral-ethical status of our everyday lives are not dirempted, as when Habermas separates communicative from instrumental reason, lifeworld from system, but woven together into a complex whole.
A more fundamental challenge to Habermasian dualism issues from MacIntyre's critique of managerial authority and the ideology of technique associated with that authority. Habermas has long feared technicism and he arrived at his communicative versus instrumental reason division precisely to counter it. Yet while this division rules out the instrumentalization of lifeworld activities, we saw that it legitimates the instrumentalization of system, of the economy and large-scale organization in general. By contrast, MacIntyre contests managerialism as a whole. In doing so he undermines Habermas's distinction between communicative and instrumental action by incorporating technique and skill under a broader conception of praxis that is the prerogative of ordinary practitioners, not bureaucratic elites.
MacIntyre's critique of managerial authority centres on two arguments. The first disputes the value neutrality of Ôeffectiveness', the term which usually underpins justifications of managerial authority. In short, Ôeffectiveness' is not neutral but a moral ideal supported by a specific worldview in which human beings are essentially consuming beings. This worldview is contested by the Aristotelian assumption that Ôwhat is essentially human is rational activity', consumption existing merely to serve this activity as it manifests itself in work, leisure, and everyday interaction. 69 Thus, managerialism is not at all neutral, above the thrust and cut of axiological debate, but is itself a controversial ethical standpoint. To this MacIntyre adds an argument against the possibility of managerial expertise, typically conceived. As he sees it, managerial expertise presumes the possibility of predicting future behaviour according to law-like generalizations. However, such prediction is rendered impossible by the inherent unpredictability and contingency of human life. 70 The social world is defined by complex multi-factorial action situations where observers must take numerous agents and their roles into account (including their own role as observer), thus frustrating all attempts to arriving at a uniquely definitive line of causality. Moreover, there is the related difficulty of defining or interpreting what a particular action context is, whether, for example, a factory stoppage is primarily due to a conflict of employer and worker interests or whether union, party, or governmental interests also play a crucial role.
71 Given this, the future is necessarily unknown and unknowable.
The basis of Frederick Taylor's and his successors' claim to manipulative competence, which characteristically legitimates their authority over workers, is therefore a Ômoral fiction … a theatre of illusions'. 72 If technicism succeeds it does so only on account of our having been hoodwinked into accepting it as natural, normal. Yet although MacIntyre spurns technicism, his theory of practices does not downplay the importance of technique and skilfulness or distance these categorically from relations of intersubjectivity. Indeed, to do so would be to repeat the theoretical errors that led Habermas to devalue productive practices. Instead, his view is that practices are intersubjective activities whose meaning goes beyond skilfulness to incorporate the realization of specific ends, yet this realization is impossible without the employment of skills. ÔWhat is distinctive in a practice', MacIntyre claims, is Ôthe way in which conceptions of the relevant goods and ends which technical skills serve -and every practice does require the exercise of technical skills -are transformed and enriched'. 73 Thus, skills or technai constitute the subordinate but nonetheless integral means to achieving 70 internal and external goods. Inserting technical skills as constitutive elements within an inclusively conceived praxis, MacIntyre thereby effects an analytic melding of the value-rational and instrumentalrational which prevents the identification of action either with mere instrumentality or pure communication. He accomplishes this, however, without relinquishing the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative activity. All worthwhile goods are attained in company with or through reliance on others and this necessary relatedness takes two rudimentary forms, a virtuous relatedness where others are treated with regard or a vicious relatedness where they suffer debasement into objects. The effects of incorporating technique within the concept of practice are deeply salutary. Most obviously, it reveals that there is a key distinction to be made between a crude instrumentalism corresponding to the Weberian ideal-type of Zweckrationalita¨t and an instrumentality or Ôpurposiveness' that is but one part of broader reflective practice. This latter notion of instrumentality, which bridges the divide between poiesis and praxis, breaks the inferential chain that leads Habermas to identify purposiveness with manipulative technique, manipulative technique with production, and thereby production or work with the domination of nature and of ourselves. Furthermore, viewing technique as just one part of human action, and of the practical wisdom (phronesis) which guides it, fatally undermines the justification for technocratic elites. 74 That justification rests on the assumption that there is an epistemically determined Ôseparation of conception from execution: managers plan and workers execute'. 75 Under this view, managers lead and workers follow because managers possess a scientific body of knowledge and methods that is superior to ordinary wisdom. But if the knowledge claimed by managers is impossible and their competence merely a charade of competence, then the rationale for the separation of conception and execution disappears, since all that remains is the competence of ordinary practitioners. As MacIntyre sees it, this competence or wisdom is acquired Ônot primarily and 74 Here I rely on Dunne's (Back to the Rough Ground, p. 365) argument that phronesis and techne are intimately related, that it was Aristotle's Ôexplicit statement that practical intellect (phronesis) governs (archei) productive intellect. And phronesis not only supervened on techne ab extra ... but also could be an intrinsic element in the exercise of the techne itself'. 75 Murphy, The Moral Economy of Labor, p. 82.
never only by theoretical reflection, but in everyday shared activities and the evaluations of alternatives that those activities impose'.
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Moreover, it is a competence that can never be possessed by a welldefined elite sealed off from the mass, but is instead the varying possession of many practitioners who abide by shared standards of excellence. Although there will be always excellent, good, mediocre, and poor carpenters or engineers, the practices of carpentry and engineering are open to all, should they pursue it. And while authoritative practitioners are in many ways exemplars, their expertise is always vulnerable to critical evaluations from those being educated into a practice.
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However, the most profound effect of incorporating technique within practice is the suggestion that the manner in which we organize productive activities is underdetermined -open to change and revision. ÔThe economic base of a society is not its tools', MacIntyre once wrote, Ôbut the people co-operating using these particular tools in the manner necessary to their use'. 78 Thus, it is not technology which determines the economy, but rather the interface of human beings with their technology. This interface suggests that the practical, our ability to evaluate ends, and the technical, the means we use in arriving at our ends, necessarily overlap. That is, the manner in which we conceive of our ends depends on how we understand our means, and our understanding of our means depends, similarly, on what we consider our ends to be. This co-generative overlap suggests, in turn, that hierarchical, fragmented, and rigidly controlled divisions of labour where workers are condemned to the repetition of simple itemized tasks are not dictated by technological or economic necessity per se, but are also the result of particular understandings of human relationships and particular evaluative ideals. As Murphy puts it, Ôefficiency' does require work to Ôbe analysed into its fundamental elements', but it does not entail that workers must Ôbe restricted to the performance of a few such elements'.
79 Indeed, production may be conducted in terms of assembly line principles where isolated and separated workers possess a 76 DRA, p. 136. 77 Thus, Ôno one at any stage can ever rule out the possibility of their present beliefs and judgements being shown to be inadequate' (WJ, p. 361). 78 limited number of skills, or it may, instead, be conducted on the basis of workers with numerous skills and extensive expertise. The key difference between the two is not the level of productivity attained, since there are differing ways to ensure the same efficient output, but the disparity in power and control enjoyed respectively by workers and their managers.
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There are, in other words, better and worse ways of institutionalizing our productive activities. Thus Knight's claim that MacIntyre's distinction between practices and institutions recalls Habermas's dichotomy between lifeworld and system rests upon a elementary misunderstanding. 81 Simply put, if stark oppositions between the practical and technical cannot be sustained, if productive activities simultaneously concern ideal and material interests, and if, as well, there can be no practice which is not institutionalized, then there is no possibility of an ontologically spatialized reality. MacIntyre does not think practices and institutions opposed; rather, his core argument is that particular institutional forms guided by specific conceptions of human nature and rationality lead to the corruption of practices.
82 These forms and conceptions were abetted by changes in ethical self-understandings from Aristotle, through Aquinas, to Hume, Kant to Nietzsche, and thereafter to contemporary Ôemotivist' liberalism. Reducing individuals to rational egoists and consumers, the institution of the capitalist market adheres to conceptions of humanity and consequent practical teloi that undermine institutions directed towards human flourishing. It is not systemic Ôde-linguistification', as suggested by Habermas's metaphor of Ôuncoupling', but perverse ethical understandings and misapprehensions of institutional ends which alienate human beings from their essential powers.
80 Murphy (ibid., p. 31) correctly points to how different Ôjob designs' achieve similar levels of productivity: where ÔFord introduced the assembly line to restrict each worker to a single task … Volvo introduced the assembly island to enable teams of workers to assemble entire vehicles'. This example clearly shows that Ôthere is freedom in the way technology synthesizes a group of tasks and … in the way technology translates tasks into jobs'. 81 Knight, The MacIntyre Reader, p. 293. 82 As MacIntyre (ÔThe Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture', The Review of Politics 52/2 (1990) 344-361, p. 360) puts it, Ôdebate and conflict as to the best forms of practices have to be debate and conflict between rival institutions and not merely between rival theories'.
The focus of MacIntyre's thought is therefore on clashing institutional orders and their discrepant practical rationalities, rather than opposed spheres or realms. In this it recalls the arguments of Booth and Durkheim as regards the evaluative underpinnings of modern capitalism, and their claim that it necessitates and requires normative ideals that permeate all of society. But while capitalism Ôprovides systematic incentives to develop a type of character', MacIntyre insists, in strong contrast to Booth and others, that this character or personality type is one defined by Ôa propensity to injustice'. 83 This condemnation of capitalism as embodying an impoverished moral-ethical vision, coupled with a refusal to theoretically dichotomize reality, lends MacIntyre's thought a critical impetus entirely lacking in Habermas. To the degree that all institutions, no matter how malformed, are guided by ethical ideals, there cannot be a realm of Ôlatent functionalism' or Ônorm-free sociality'. The thought that as regards the economy and production we are under the thrall of an invisible and near all-powerful Ôsecond nature' is therefore dismissed as a species of liberalism's ideological Ôdivorce' of Ôman's political status from his economic status'.
84 The task at hand, then, is not to push back Ôcolonization' of lifeworld by system, all the while respecting the dirempted logics of these opposed arenas, but to recognize and to recover system as intimately part of our lifeworld.
CONCLUSION
The Ômaking and sustaining of forms of human community -and therefore of institutions -itself has all the characteristics of a practice', and one, moreover, which is just as applicable to our productive lives as to our lives as citizens, family members, or consumers. 85 This realization that the way in which we institutionalize our productive activities is more than a technical issue, but also an ethical and political concern, is what fundamentally separates Habermas from MacIntyre. It is also what renders MacIntyre's thought a key resource in recovering an emancipatory conception of work. Such a recovery necessitates significant revision of our 83 MC, p. xiv (my emphasis). 84 Ibid., p. 133. 85 AV, p. 194. dominant understandings of the economy and of politics. Against Ôaccumulation for its own sake or for the sake of possession', a dominant prejudice of our society, we must realize that Ôpossession of things or of money as a resource to acquire things is warranted only insofar as it contributes to activity which has goods internal to itself of the appropriate kind'. 86 That activity, of course, consists in the final analysis in the realization of the good life, not the perpetuation of mere life. Similarly, politics can no longer be seen as the accumulation of power, the defence of private interest, or the execution of bureaucratically determined policy. Instead, an Aristotelian politics sets itself the threefold task of nurturing the conditions of human flourishing, facilitating those diverse practices in which flourishing manifests itself, and advancing communal ideals through reflective critique. So conceived, politics is an activity Ôthrough which other types of practice are ordered so that individuals may direct themselves towards what is best for them and their community'. 87 I have argued that MacIntyre's approach surpasses Habermasian critical theory in furnishing us with an intersubjective conception of work and in avoiding the pitfalls of social dualism. By way of conclusion, however, it is necessary briefly to register partial doubt regarding MacIntyre's position. This doubt stems from MacIntyre's thorough-going anti-modernism and his adherence to Karl Polanyi's Ôdisembedding' thesis. 88 MacIntyre dismisses modernity and its central institutions, the state and capitalist market, as irredeemably inimical to practice-like endeavour. In modernity political and economic life Ôis a civil war carried on by other means' where factional will-to-power has triumphed over the common good. 89 This is due to basic changes in our conception of ourselves and the rise of the modern state, but also to the Ôdisembedding' of the economy in the early modern period, which, as diagnosed by Polanyi, gave rise to modern capitalism. From Homeric Greece to the Medieval period, production had occurred within the household 86 and was therefore rooted within and incomprehensible without reference to the social relationships, expectations, and Ôwider forms of community which the household … sustains'. 90 The pursuit of wealth, power, and status was consequently kept in check by a complete institutional nexus or social Ôwhole' which presupposed the existence of a common good upheld by shared virtues of character. However, this institutional nexus was torn asunder with the birth of the modern market and non-household based production. A sphere of life now radically separate from that of family or politics, the modern market economy assumed the form of a Ôself-regulating' domain recognizing no social roles or values except the imperatives of profit-making and consumption. 91 The effect, MacIntyre claims, was to expel practices to Ôthe margins of social and cultural life', to those largely self-sufficient small-scale local communities in Ôwhich the activities of families, workplaces, schools, clinics, clubs dedicated to debate and clubs dedicated to games and sports, and religious congregations … all find a place'. 92 The exemplars of meaningful working life are not the modern firm and factory, but Donegal farming co-operatives, Mayan communities in Guatemala and Mexico, Welsh mining communities, and New England fishing villages.
There are two key problems with this narrative. The first is the theoretical incoherence engendered by MacIntyre's recourse to the Ôdisembedding' thesis. I argued in the previous section that MacIntyre is to be praised for avoiding social dualism and stressing the ethical character of all social forms, even impoverished forms such as modern capitalism and bureaucracy. ÔEvery action is the bearer and expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts' and Ôevery piece of theorizing and every expression of belief is a political and moral action'. 93 Thus, the manager and stockbroker are moral characters expressing specific ethical ideals, no less than the characters of citizen or of craftsperson. The problem with the Ôdisembedding' thesis, however, is that it is virtually identical to Habermas's Ôuncoupling' thesis. 94 Both presume that there was a radical historical break between pre-modernity and modernity; both presume that this break consisted in the appearance of a Ôself-regulating' or Ônorm-free' economic sphere; and both, finally, divide reality into different spheres -one realm where ethical relations are at home, and another purged of all imperatives except that of profit. MacIntyre's acceptance of Polanyi's thesis threatens, therefore, to return him to the problematic binaries and spatializations which his thought otherwise contests, since it is impossible to consistently accept this thesis and to reject social dualism. 95 The second problem is MacIntyre's sweeping dismissal of the major institutional settings of modern life: his stress that it is only in the periphery of modern society, in those towns and villages which retain the integrated character of pre-modern communities, that practice-like endeavour can be maintained. This dismissal is suspect for a number of reasons, not least MacIntyre's rather superficial assessment of the hierarchies and exclusions which defined pre-modern communities; the unsubstantiated and nostalgic assumption that the productive activities of pre-modern workers were predominantly practice-like; the implausible and reductive conjecture that capitalism takes but one form; and his failure to recognize the structural interpenetration of local communities and trans-communal institutions, whether national or supra-national. However, by far the most problematic implication of this dismissal is the supposition that those institutions -firms, businesses, factories, service industries, private and public bureaucracies -within which the vast majority of contemporary workers spend their productive lives are incapable of internal transformation.
Of course, MacIntyre is right to think that such institutions are subject to increasing managerial control. He is also right to question the present likelihood of radical, large-scale alterations in the structures of existing capitalism. But he errs in excluding the 94 See, for instance, Habermas's argument, following Polanyi, that Ôin the nonmonetarized economic activities of archaic societies, the mechanism of exchange has so little detached itself from normative contexts that a clear separation between economic and noneconomic values is hardly possible' (TCA, II, p. 163). 95 Note that one can reject the Ôdisembedding' thesis whilst nonetheless endorsing MacIntyre's claims about Ôcompartmentalization'. ÔCompartmentalization' entails that there are separate spheres of life governed by different norms and ideals. ÔDis-embedding', by contrast, entails that there is one sphere of life, the economic, which is distinct from others in being norm-free. possibility of reform, of lessening the deformations perpetuated by the current economic order. His mistake here is to assume all modern institutions are necessarily doomed to take a Taylorist form.
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This assumption neglects the political contingency of Taylorism's success, its status as an ideology which need not have gained dominance and which stands vulnerable to subversion, as suggested by MacIntyre's own critique of managerial authority. Indeed, the activities housed within modern institutions -whether nursing, education, manufacturing, retailing, or even management itselfremain subject to fierce internal contests that recurrently problematize the everyday arrangement and wider social meaning of our working lives. Yet it is precisely these real, if indeterminate and precarious, opportunities for resistance, for rendering modern work more practice-like, that are occluded by MacIntyre's totalizing repudiation of modern life. Thus, while his theory of practice eschews ontological spatialization, a profound disillusionment with the present premised upon an idealized vision of pre-modernity tempts him into a position structurally analogous to that of Habermas. Practitioners' productive powers may no longer fall under the sign of latent functionality, but those citizen competencies or worker capacities interwoven with the modern state and economy unfortunately do, meaning that large areas of human endeavour are once again distanced from critique.
If we are to constructively employ MacIntyre's theory of practice to lessen the excision of meaning and purpose from our working lives, it has to be on the basis of modern social forms and institutions, not peripheral communities. Indeed, it is because he fails to acknowledge this that MacIntyre's thought tends toward paradox. MacIntyre commits himself to the Aristotelian assertion that Ôthe life of virtue within the community of the polis is available only to those who already participate more or less fully in that life'. 97 That is, only through inculcation within pre-existing authoritative standards do the young learn what it is to be proficient reflective practitioners and thereafter take over these standards to maintain, augment, or reject them. The good is already but imperfectly 96 An assumption implied in his claim that in modern Ôculture we know of no organized movement towards power that is not bureaucratic and managerial in mode and we know of no justifications for authority which are not Weberian [and technicist] in form' (AV: 109, my emphasis).
97 WJ, p. 110.
in the world, not hidden from view in some speculative realm of Platonic Ideas and known only to a few. 98 Yet modernity is also said to exclude practices and the common goods embodied within them. Those born within the social structures of modernity lack the educative and institutional pre-requisites to advance or even to identify their own and their common good. The unavoidable implication is that for actors not belonging to marginalized pre-modern communities there exists little possibility of practical learning and, by inference, of critiquing received standards. But if this is so, then MacIntyre is caught in a dilemma, for contemporary actors, the Ôplain persons' of whom he constantly speaks, cannot be simultaneously capable and incapable of perceiving a temporally located good. He must either hold to Aristotle's claim that the good exists and admit that modernity is receptive, however imperfectly, to practices and their educative structures or hold to his totalizing critique and reject Aristotle in favour of some latter-day Platonism. [90] [91] [92] [93] himself praises Aristotle's defence of ordinary citizens against Plato's Philosopher-King and Ôpessimism about the social world'. However, he fails to perceive his own slip into a form of Platonism in separating the many who spend their lives in modern social forms from the minority who comprise pre-modern communities.
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